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Abstract 
 
The financial sector is unique in being largely self-governed: the majority of financial firms’ shares 
are held by other financial institutions. This raises the possibility that monitoring of financial firms is 
especially undermined by conflicts of interest due to personal and professional links between these 
firms and their shareholders. To investigate this possibility, we scrutinize the aspect of the financial 
sector’s self-governance that is directly observable: mutual fund companies’ voting of their peers’ 
stock. We find that considerations specific to investee firms’ membership in the same industry as their 
investors do indeed impact voting. This impact is in the direction of supporting the investee’s 
management. We show that the own-industry effect reduces director efficacy and lowers firm value as 
a result. We extend our analysis to other financial companies and show that they also tend to vote 
more favorably when it comes to their peers. Our results suggest that peer support is a corrupting 
factor in the financial sector’s governance. 
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1. Introduction 
The financial sector includes institutional investors who dominate corporate shareholdings.1 This 
means that the financial sector has the distinction of being controlled by shareholders who are its 
members. If the exercise of voting rights is affected by membership of the same industry, this should 
impact the governance of financial firms relative to that of non-financial firms. Specifically, this may 
lead to voting to undermine one’s rivals or to support one’s peers. Our paper examines this issue in 
depth for mutual funds, the only type of institutional investor whose voting behavior is consistently 
observable. In other words, we study whether membership of the same industry as that of the firm 
they vote on influences mutual fund voting behavior. We find no evidence of funds seeking to 
undermine their rivals, but we do find evidence of peer support. We show that the own-industry effect 
reduces director efficacy and lowers firm value as a result. We additionally examine voting outcomes 
in the financial sector as a whole, and also find evidence consistent with peer support. Our results 
have potentially wide-ranging implications for the (self) governance of the financial sector. 
The quality of governance in financial firms has been widely questioned, particularly in the wake 
of the recent financial crisis. These governance failures have been blamed in part on conflicts of 
interest pertaining to financial institutions as shareholders. For example, a European Commission 
report on the governance of financial institutions states that “Conflicts of interest apparently arise 
most often because of lack of sufficient independence of institutional investors or their asset managers 
within financial groups. However, conflicts of interest can arise within institutional investors and 
asset managers too in numbers of ways, for instance on a personal level, as a consequence of the 
existence of ‘old boys’ networks’” (European Commission, 2010). 
The above quote implies that both firm-level and personal-level conflicts of interest may be 
particularly common in the governance of financial institutions as compared to that of non-financial 
firms. This is plausible, since both professional and personal links are more likely to be present when 
                                                 
1 Throughout the paper, we refer to the financial sector as a broad grouping of financial services firms that comprise multiple 
industries (the mutual fund industry, the banking industry, the insurance industry, etc.). 
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the investor and investee are both financial firms.2 However, we are not aware of studies that examine 
such conflicts in the specific context of the financial sector. 
Our paper focuses on three types of conflict of interest, which are more likely to be present when 
the firm being voted on is in the financial sector than when it is not. The first one is the “old boys’ 
network” effect. Decision-makers at the investing firm are especially likely to be connected to their 
counterparts at the investee if both have finance backgrounds: they are more likely to have received 
the same education, to be active in the same professional organizations, to have worked at the same 
companies in their past careers, and to expect to do so in the future. The notion that professional 
interaction of this kind can influence decision-making has found support in a number of recent papers. 
For example, Ishii and Xuan (2010) report that targets whose senior management is more connected 
to their acquirer through educational background and past employment are more likely to retain their 
CEOs and directors post-merger and the retained CEOs are better compensated post-merger. In a 
context closest to ours, Butler and Gurun (2012) show that mutual funds vote more against proposals 
to limit CEO pay when the fund manager shares the CEO’s educational background.  
The second type of conflict of interest between the institutional investor and investee that is more 
common when the investee is also a financial firm is due to firm-level interaction. The existence of 
intra-industry competitive effects, whereby one firm’s value-increasing actions decrease the value of 
its rivals are well documented, and cover a wide range of firm actions such as new product 
introductions (Chen, Ho and Ik, 2005), management forecasts (Kim, Lacina, and Park, 2008), mergers 
(Becher, Mulherin and Walkling, 2012), and stock repurchases (Massa, Rehman and Vermaelen, 
2007) to name a few.3  This literature implies that when a financial firm votes on an industry rival, it 
                                                 
2 Consider, for example, the March 31, 2005 re-election of the notoriously combative Lehman CEO Dick Fuld to the 
company’s board. Mr. Fuld’s bid received 87.3% investor support only four years before his being ranked as “the worst CEO 
of all time” by Portfolio magazine (http://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2009/04/23/fuld-tops-portfolios-worst-ceo-list/). 
Around two-thirds of Lehman’s stock was held by other financial institutions, the top ten being Citigroup, State Street, 
Barclays, MSDW, Vanguard, AXA, Fisher Investments, MFS, Mellon Bank, and Merrill Lynch. Most of these firms and 
their managers could be expected to have repeated dealings with Lehman and its management. Mr. Fuld is on record as 
saying “I want to reach in, rip out their heart, and eat it, before they die” 
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GZCmWkQuyPc) about his professional adversaries. Voting at Lehman was not 
confidential, meaning that Lehman’s management could find out which shareholders voted for or against any given proposal. 
3 Of course, the effect of a vote on rivals’ valuation need not be a zero-sum game. There can be positive externalities 
whereby the whole industry benefits from the passage of a proposal. For example, less restrictive executive compensation at 
one mutual fund company could signal the mutual fund industry’s increased ability to attract talented executives from hedge 
funds, and to benefit rival firms as a result. We seek to capture such common interests by checking whether rival firms 
tabled similar proposals. 
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may face a conflict of interest whereby its fiduciary responsibility of increasing the rival firm’s value 
may be at odds with the firm’s incentive to undermine the rival. If the peer group is defined broadly 
enough, however, there could be supplier and distributor-type links between peer group members. 
The third type of conflict of interest that is more likely to be observed between investor and 
investee when the investee is a financial firm is due to cross-holdings of shares.4 A financial firm may 
hold shares in its own institutional shareholder, which gives the firm another potential means of 
retaliating for any anti-management votes by that shareholder, e.g. by voting against the shareholder’s 
own management. Conversely, investor and investee may reciprocate by supporting each other. While 
tit-for-tat corporate voting has not been studied in the literature, Bang (2010) finds evidence of tit-for-
tat compensation when CEOs sit on each other’s boards. Cross-shareholdings by institutional 
investors are also reminiscent of keiretsus, whose members are known to cooperate with each other 
(Berglöf and Perotti, 1994). As the extent of cross-shareholdings is much smaller in our context, 
whether it translates into management-friendly voting remains an empirical issue. 
Using a sample of 14,554 votes cast by 108 mutual fund companies (MFCs) during 2004-2013, 
our paper studies whether these conflicts of interest actually influence voting. To compare how MFCs 
vote on own-industry firms as opposed to how they vote on firms from outside their industry we take 
a sample of within-industry proposals that they vote on and match these to a set of management 
proposals drawn from outside the industry based on proposal type and on the identity of the voting 
MFC. We show that MFCs are almost 50% more likely to oppose management of firms involved in 
unrelated activities than to oppose management of firms in their own industry. We examine reasons 
why this may be the case by focusing on how MFCs vote on other MFCs.  
First, voting appears to be influenced by the fear of retaliation, either in the form of being voted 
against in the future or being aggressively competed against in the future. Second, social ties between 
the voting and target firms increase the voting firm’s support for the target’s management. Our results 
suggest that there is “clubbiness” in the way MFCs vote on each other.5 We then go on to examine the 
                                                 
4 In the paper we interchangeably use the terms ‘voter’, ‘voting firm’ and ‘investor’ to refer to the party that votes, and we 
refer to the party being voted on as ‘target firm’ or ‘investee’. 
5 The Oxford English Dictionary defines “clubbiness” as “the quality of being friendly and sociable with fellow members of 
a group but not with outsiders” (http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/clubbiness). Clubs, 
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implications of this clubbiness. We show that directors elected in fund companies with greater own-
industry support monitor senior management significantly less. This is recognized by the market and 
so the size of abnormal returns earned at the time these directors are elected is decreasing in the level 
of own-industry support. To generalize our findings, we then examine whether other financial 
companies apart from MFCs also vote more favorably when it comes to their own-industry members 
and we find evidence that this is the case as well.  
 Figure 1 shows how the voting interactions we study fit into the overall governance of the 
financial sector. To a large extent, public companies in the financial sector are held (and therefore 
governed) by other financial firms – both public and private. Both public and private financial firms 
vote on publicly held finance companies, represented by the dashed arrows. However, although the 
public companies themselves know how their investors voted, this information is not available to 
outsiders, except for the aggregate voting outcome. Instead, we can observe voting patterns within a 
subset of the financial sector: the mutual fund industry, which is represented by the continuous 
arrows. The figure shows that our sample comprises 17 public MFCs that vote on each other, as well 
as 91 private MFCs that vote on the public ones. 
The notion that conflicts of interest influence voting by institutional shareholders has received 
support in the literature. Davis and Kim (2005), Ashraf, Jayaraman, and Ryan (2011) and Cvijanovic, 
Dasgupta, Zachariadis (2014) all examine how MFCs vote on firms to which they provide pension 
fund services. While Davis and Kim and Ashraf et al. find that companies with more pension fund 
clients vote more with management across the board as opposed to favoring own clients, Cvijanovic 
et al. re-examine the evidence and conclude that MFCs do vote more with clients. Butler and Gurun 
(2012) examine how fund managers vote on shareholder proposals to limit CEO pay when the fund 
manager and the CEO are connected through an educational network. They find significant evidence 
that fund managers vote to limit CEO pay less when the fund manager and the CEO share the same 
                                                                                                                                                        
clans, cliques, tribes, and other social groups are a complex nexus of relationships fostered by common interests, goals, 
backgrounds, beliefs, and so on. If membership in such a group is valued and/or sticky (as it typically is) then fear of 
retaliation can be as much of a driving force behind ostensibly friendly behavior as the hope of reciprocation, or simple 
homophily. Our use of the term ‘clubbiness’ encompasses all these driving forces. 
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education. Agrawal (2012) studies how union pension funds vote and finds that they not only seem to 
care about the interests of their pension fund clients but also pursue worker interests.  
Our paper sits at the intersection of the literatures on shareholder voting, the behavior of financial 
institutions, and competitive interactions between rival firms. Our contribution to the shareholder 
voting literature consists of identifying a novel conflict of interest between the voter and the target, 
whereby the two compete in the same product market. Unlike in conflicts of interest studied 
elsewhere, our conflicted parties are entire organizations rather than their departments/divisions 
(Davis and Kim, 2005, Ashraf et al., 2011 and Cvijanovic et al., 2014) or individuals (Butler and 
Gurun, 2012) within them. This means that retaliation by the target can take place on multiple fronts 
such as in the product market, through voting, in the labor market, through corporate communication, 
and through interactions with customers and suppliers. In existing work, retaliation by the target can 
take place on one front alone. For example in Davis and Kim (2005), the impact of retaliation by the 
target is limited to the loss of the annual management fee paid by the target’s pension plan (the 
median fee does not exceed $0.2 million). Alternatively, in Butler and Gurun’s setting, any potential 
retaliation operates via personal relationships between the target’s CEO and the fund manager (even 
though fund managers often do not make voting decisions on their own). The amount that can be lost, 
then, is the hypothesized personal relationship between the fund manager and the CEO.  
Our contribution to the literature on financial institutions is, first, to identify and study new 
conflicts of interest that may prompt them to deviate from their fiduciary duty to clients. Further, our 
paper is the first, to our knowledge, to advance and find support for the assertion that financial 
institutions’ collective indulgence of their industry peers undermines the financial sector’s 
governance.  
Lastly, our paper contributes to our understanding of the scope of interaction among rival firms. It 
is well known that product market competitors react to each other’s actions in adjacent spheres such 
as recruitment, R&D and advertising. We show, however, that the implications of product market 
competition can extend even further, to such outlying activities as the exercise of voting rights. 
Our work has at least two important policy implications. First, the notion of conflicts of interest, 
which institutional investors address in their voting policies, should be explicitly defined to include 
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not only voting on target firms they do business with, but also voting on target firms they compete 
with. Doing so would take voting out of the hands of individuals most inclined to vote in a conflicted 
manner and/or constrain these individuals’ discretion.6  Second, proxy voting should be required to be 
confidential at firms in the financial sector; i.e. targets should not be able to discover how different 
shareholders voted. This would mitigate a key reason for conflicted voting on a peer company, which 
is potential retaliation/reciprocation by the peer’s management. 
Our paper has the following structure. In Section 2 we present the institutional details relating to 
voting and develop our hypotheses. In Section 3 we introduce our data. In Section 4 we present our 
results relating to voting by MFCs. In Section 5 we extend our findings to voting by all financial 
firms. Section 6 presents our robustness tests and Section 7 concludes.  
2. Institutional background and hypotheses 
2.1. Institutional details 
The largest owners of stock in US companies are institutional investors. According to Conference 
Board (2010), institutional investors owned 73% of the largest one thousand US corporations in 2009. 
Among institutions, MFCs were the largest stock owners with a 36% share of this holding. Being the 
dominant institutional investor type gives MFCs considerable corporate influence.  
A key arena where they can exercise this influence is shareholder proxy voting. Each mutual fund 
votes on proposals contained in the proxy statement of each company whose stock it holds. Proxy 
statements contain proposals put forward both by the management and by the shareholders of the 
company concerned. Mutual funds have a fiduciary duty to vote in the interests of their investors on 
these proposals. Prior to 2003, the way mutual funds voted was not subject to public disclosure 
requirements and it was often argued that mutual funds were too soft on corporate management and 
that they suffered from conflicts of interest (e.g. Teitelbaum, 2003). In addition, it was claimed that 
                                                 
6 For example, the following describes ways in which Aberdeen Asset Management addresses material conflicts of interest 
in its proxy voting policy: “When a material conflict of interest between an Aberdeen Adviser’s interests and its clients’ 
interests appears to exist, the Aberdeen Adviser may choose among the following options to eliminate such conflict: (1) vote 
in accordance with these Policies and Procedures if it involves little or no discretion; (2) vote as recommended by a third 
party service if the Aberdeen Adviser utilizes such a service; (3) “echo vote” or “mirror vote” the proxies in the same 
proportion as the votes of other proxy holders that are not Aberdeen clients; (4) if possible, erect information barriers 
around the person or persons making voting decisions sufficient to insulate the decision from the conflict; (5) if practical, 
notify affected clients of the conflict of interest and seek a waiver of the conflict; or (6) if agreed upon in writing with the 
client, forward the proxies to affected clients allowing them to vote their own proxies.” 
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mutual funds frequently abstained from voting. To encourage mutual funds to engage more actively 
with the governance process, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) decided to require 
funds to disclose their votes starting in 2003. This regulatory action was prompted in part by the 
Enron scandal, which led to a drive to improve corporate governance in the US. Whether the change 
in disclosure rules had an impact on how mutual funds vote is open to discussion. While Cremers and 
Romano (2007) find little evidence that MFCs changed their behavior after they were required to 
make public how they voted, Davis and Kim (2007) suggest that MFCs are wary of the public 
scrutiny that they face when voting especially since the change in disclosure rules in 2003. 
As MFCs vote on multiple proposals by many firms, they often enlist the help of a proxy advisory 
firm such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) or Glass Lewis to provide guidance on how to 
vote in a value increasing fashion. Bethel and Gillan (2002) show that proxy advisory firms play an 
important role in influencing the outcome of shareholder votes. 
Rothberg and Lilien (2006) describe voting procedures that are used by the largest US mutual 
fund families. Certain management companies use a committee formed at the company level and have 
company-level voting guidelines for each proposal type. For example, Fidelity will generally vote 
against the introduction of new classes of voting stock with differential voting rights. If there is no 
policy, each vote is generally considered on a case-by-case basis. Each mutual fund managed by the 
fund company votes on the shares it owns. In companies where voting is not centralized, fund 
managers have more freedom as to how they vote. Recent work by Morgan, Poulsen, Wolf, and Yang 
(2011) has shown that there may be greater differences in the way funds within a family vote for 
shareholder proposals than for management proposals. As there are far fewer shareholder proposals 
than management proposals and because of shareholder proposals’ greater heterogeneity we focus in 
this study on management proposals alone. (If we include shareholder proposals in our analysis this 
has little meaningful effect on our results.) Our aim is to understand whether being in the same 
business makes MFCs vote differently on each other from how they vote on non-industry firms. In 
order to examine whether mutual funds vote differently in the presence of conflicts of interest, we 
benchmark their votes against the target firm management’s voting recommendation. 
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2.2. Hypotheses 
We are interested in whether MFCs vote differently on their industry peers from how they vote on 
other firms. We propose two competing hypotheses as possible drivers of voting behavior.  
 The first hypothesis is the rivalry hypothesis. Under this hypothesis, voting MFCs see target 
MFCs primarily as rivals and their prime concern is inhibiting the conduct of business of these 
competitors. In this case, we would expect MFCs to vote more against the management of rival MFCs 
as compared to how they would vote on other firms.  
 The second hypothesis is the clubbiness hypothesis. Under this hypothesis, voting MFCs support 
target MFCs more than they do other firms. This could be driven by the fear of retaliation (on the 
downside) or by the hope of reciprocation (on the upside). In particular, rival MFCs may retaliate by 
voting against the voting company. Rivals can also get back at each other by competing more 
vigorously in the future. For example the target can retaliate against the voting company by 
advertising aggressively against them, by poaching their employees, by threatening their distributors 
or by starting funds in their sectors. Alternatively, clubbiness could have its origin in professional 
interactions between senior employees of the voting and target firms. For example, a decision-maker 
at the voting firm may wish to avoid antagonizing managers of another firm in the same industry in 
view of their possible future interactions in the labor market, professional bodies, or lobbying the 
legislature over common causes. In summary, clubbiness can be the result of several phenomena 
expected to generate peer support including the fear of retaliation, the hope of reciprocation, and the 
presence of social ties. 
3. Data 
We obtain our voting data from the voting analytics database provided by ISS which collects MFC 
voting data from mutual funds’ form NP-X annual submissions. Mutual funds are required by the 
SEC to file this form at the end of August of each year, disclosing how they voted on different 
proposals during the course of the year ending June 30th. For each proposal, the form contains 
information on the content of the proposal, whether it was proposed by the issuer or by a shareholder, 
and details of how the fund voted. Observations in the ISS database are at the fund-proposal level. 
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Mandatory submission of form NP-X was phased in during 2003 but because submissions were not 
fully up and running till the end of the year, our data span the period from the start of 2004 to the end 
of 2013. The ISS database also contains the ISS recommendation regarding the proposals, the number 
of shares voted for the proposal and the proposal outcome. 
[Table 1] 
Our aim is to understand how MFCs vote when they hold stock in other MFCs. While the target 
company whose proposal is being voted on is necessarily public, the voting company can be either 
public or private. Table 1 contains descriptive statistics on the number and size of the target MFCs in 
our sample. In addition, the table presents statistics on the public versus private mix and the number 
of MFCs that invested in these target MFCs in our sample.  
Our sample contains 17 public MFCs that may both vote and be voted on and 91 private MFCs 
that vote on the public companies but are not voted on. This is illustrated in Figure 1. When we focus 
on voting by public firms only, our sample comprises 70 distinct voter-target pairs, representing 1,677 
voting decisions. When we study voting by both public and private firms, our sample grows to 468 
distinct voter-target pairs, representing 14,554 voting decisions. Appendix A presents a list of MFCs 
contained in our sample for each category.  
 In Table 2 Panel A, we present the fraction of MFCs in our sample held by institutional investors 
based on the 13F database. This database contains ownership information by institutional managers 
with greater than $100 million of equity securities under discretionary management; common stock 
positions greater than 10,000 shares or those valued at $200,000 or more are included. We use 
Bushee’s (1998) investment type classification and our identification of MFCs from the ISS voting 
data to aggregate ownership by institutional type across firm-years. The table shows that around a half 
of mutual fund shares are held by other finance concerns, illustrating the extent of the self-governance 
in the financial services sector. Importantly, the average size of the ownership stake held by all MFCs 
is 19%, the largest among all groups of institutional investors holding the target shares. 
Table 2 Panel B presents descriptive statistics on the cross-holdings between MFCs in our sample. 
To understand how important the target company’s shares are in the voting company’s portfolio, we 
calculate the proportion of the investing MFC portfolio represented by the target MFC shares. We 
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report this variable as holding stake in Table 2 Panel B, and it can be seen from the table that the 
average holding stake is around a fifth of one percent. These stakes are so small because MFCs hold 
well diversified portfolios.  
In our sample, the average fraction of the target held by the voting company, which we term 
ownership stake, is 0.31% and these stakes aggregate to the 19% total holding by all MFCs.7 The 
average number of MFCs holding each target MFC in our sample is 76. The fraction of voting stocks 
held in the investing MFC by the target MFC (which we call ‘reciprocal stake’) has a median of 0.3% 
and is on average 0.68% indicating that it is right skewed.8   
To understand how MFCs vote on each other, we need to aggregate the ISS data to the fund 
family level. We do so using the approach taken by both Davis and Kim (2007) and Ashraf et al. 
(2012), i.e. we register the fund family as supporting a proposal if the majority of its funds support the 
proposal and opposing it otherwise (but note that lack of unanimity within a family is uncommon, and 
excluding such votes does not alter our results).  
[Table 3] 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of proposals voted by MFCs. Between 2004 and 2013 
MFCs cast 14,554 votes pertaining to 608 proposals that were tabled by other MFCs. The proposals 
voted on were drawn from 17 categories. While a large fraction of the proposals are concerned with 
the election of directors, many types are concerned with other corporate decisions such as the 
approval of merger agreements, increasing common stock and the approval of executive bonus plans.  
4. Empirical analyses of voting by MFCs   
In the first part of this section, we report on how MFCs vote on own-industry firms as compared to 
how they vote on firms from other industries. In the second part, we zoom in on voting within the 
mutual fund industry which allows us to Model the interactions between MFCs in greater detail.  
4.1. Summary statistics of votes cast by MFCs 
[Table 4] 
                                                 
7 The dollar value of cross holdings can be large, and in our dataset the largest cross holding is $678 million by BlackRock 
in Franklin Resources in December 2009. 
8 The Investment Company Act of 1940 Rule 12d-3 specifies that US mutual funds are prohibited from owning more than 5% 
of other investment companies, defined as firms that derive more than 15% of revenue from securities-related activity. 
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To begin, we present in Table 4 summary statistics on how MFCs voted across all industries, 
including their own. Panel A shows the number of proposals voted and passed and Panel B shows the 
total number of votes cast and the proportion in favor of management. Between 2004 and 2013, 
14,554 votes were cast on 608 proposals by MFCs on other MFCs. Of these votes, 93.3% were cast 
with management. At the same time, approximately 9.8 million votes were cast by MFCs on firms 
outside their industry, 90.2% of these votes being with management.  
Table 4 Panel C presents t-statistics and z-statistics that test whether there is a significant 
difference in votes cast with management and proposal pass rates between the mutual fund industry 
and all the 48 Fama and French industries, based on the Fama and French (1997) classifications. At 
first it may appear that, in spite of its statistical significance (t-statistic of 14.84 and z-statistic of 
12.47), the 3.1 percentage point difference between inter-industry and intra-industry management 
support has modest economic significance. This is not so. First, this translates into an intra-industry 
rejection rate for management proposals that is nearly 50% higher (3.1% / (100%-93.3%) = 1.46) than 
the inter-industry one. Second, the effect of the target’s industry membership on the proportion of 
management proposals receiving a given level of support is even stronger. 
For example, while only 100%-96.22%=3.78% of management proposals originating within the 
mutual fund industry are rejected by the majority of shareholders, the rejection rate for non-industry 
proposals is 100%-90.51%=9.49%, with the difference highly statistically significant. The 
9.49%/3.78%=2.51 “rejection ratio” means that being outside the fund industry increases the 
management’s chances of defeat by over 150%, an enormous disparity.  
Of course, shareholder votes are generally non-binding. Instead, analysts and observers tend to 
scrutinize the size of the opposition to management, with hurdles such as 30%, 20%, and 10% being 
important in attracting both manager and media attention.9  In fact, even shareholder opposition in the 
single digits can be deemed strong enough to attract media interest and to be termed “embarrassing” 
                                                 
9 E.g. an article in the Wall Street Journal states that “in general, approval rates of 95% or higher are common, and a 
withheld-votes rate of more than 20% is considered high.” (Taken from “Corporate News: Yahoo holders express anger at 
executive pay” of 14/06/2007”.) 
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and “a shareholder rebellion”.10  As Table 4 Panel C shows, for 70%, 80% and 90% hurdle rates, the 
difference in intra-industry and inter-industry support is always highly statistically significant, with 
rejection ratios of 2.26, 2.20 and 1.89, respectively.  
Table 4 Panel C also shows average voting results for each of the 48 Fama-French industries 
excluding the mutual fund industry. The strength of support of MFCs for their own industry is 
immediately obvious as both the pass rate and the proportion of management support are higher for 
the mutual fund industry than for any of the 48 Fama-French industries. 
Overall, our summary statistics show that MFCs vote more frequently with management in their 
own industry. However, these results do not control for other influences on the voting decision. We 
now turn to this issue. 
4.2. Cross-industry regressions 
Our aim is to examine the intensity with which MFCs vote in favor of management on own-industry 
members versus on members of other industries. In Table 5, we Model the decision to vote with 
management using an indicator variable that equals one if a given MFC votes in favor of 
management. As the dependent variable in this regression is a categorical variable, we take a logit 
regression approach.  
Many MFCs have company-level voting guidelines for each proposal type and therefore, in our 
logit regressions, we use fixed effects for voting company/proposal type combinations.11  To control 
for time variation in voting behavior we also include year fixed effects. All our standard errors are 
double clustered by voting company and proposal type to allow for correlation in voting behavior 
between different MFCs for a particular proposal type and for voting by the same MFC. For example, 
if all MFCs are voting on amending an omnibus stock plan then we assume that the way they vote will 
be correlated. In addition, if BlackRock is voting on the election of a particular director and on an 
omnibus stock plan at a given target firm, then we assume the two voting decisions are correlated. 
                                                 
10 See for example, the media response to 8% shareholder opposition to Shell’s CEO pay proposal  
(http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/may/21/shell-suffers-embarrassing-shareholder-rebellion)  
11 The voting company / proposal type combination fixed effects are statistically significant in most cases. For example, in 
Model 1 of Table 5, 94% of the fixed effects are significant at the 5% level or below. This confirms the value of including 
fixed effects in this format in our regressions. 
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To determine our final sample, we use a matching approach that is based on voting company and 
proposal type. We have 14,554 observations of mutual fund votes on other MFCs. For each of these 
votes by MFC (i) on proposal type (j) on MFC (k) we match it to a vote by the same MFC (i) on the 
same proposal type (j) in the same voting season but with the target of the vote being a company that 
is outside the mutual fund industry and is closest in size to the original MFC (k), where size is 
measured using market capitalization, which is available for listed MFCs. We exclude firms in the 
financial industry from the non-mutual fund group in our matching procedure.12 This matching 
procedure helps us ensure that these characteristics do not explain differences in voting behavior.  
To explain the decision to vote with management we use a number of control variables together 
with a dummy variable own industry that equals one if the company whose proposal is being voted on 
is from the mutual fund industry as well and zero if it is from any other industries. As a MFC is more 
likely to vote for management if ISS supports management we include a dummy variable 
ISS=management, which equals one if ISS agrees with management’s recommendation on a particular 
proposal. The impact of the ISS recommendation on the way MFCs vote may be different if the 
recommendation relates to own-industry companies as opposed to other firms. This is because one 
may expect MFCs to believe that they have a richer information set when it comes to their own-
industry investments and therefore to pay less heed to the ISS recommendation in these cases. Due to 
this, we interact ISS=management with own industry  to allow for this possibility. 
We also include the variable holding stake which measures how much the voting MFC has 
invested in the target. It is defined as the fraction of the value of the voting company’s total portfolio 
invested in the target company’s shares. We would expect that if the voting MFC has a larger amount 
invested in the target, it is more optimistic about the future performance of the target and hence is 
more likely to agree with the actions of its management.  
It may be argued that the holding stake and ownership stake variables are endogenous as fund 
companies wishing to vote more strongly with management may take a larger position. To address 
this potential endogeneity issue, we use the fuzzy regression discontinuity design approach as in 
                                                 
12 The purpose of this is to make our tests more powerful as non-mutual fund financial companies may also vote more with 
MFCs due to financial companies generally being more supportive of each other. We thank the referee for making this 
suggestion. 
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Schmidt (2012) and Fich, Harford, and Tran (2015). When the Russell 1000 and 2000 indices are 
reconstituted each June, fund management companies tracking these indexes are forced to change 
their holdings accordingly. We use these events to generate exogenous changes in the stake variables. 
We employ a two-stage instrumental variable approach. We first regress changes in holding stake and 
ownership stake on discrete changes in Russell membership of portfolio firms and on control 
variables. We measure the changes in the holding stake and ownership stake from the third quarter of 
prior year to the third quarter of the current year as the Russell indexes are reconstituted in June every 
year. The results of doing this are presented in Model 1 of Appendix B for the holding stake 
dependent variable and in Model 2 of Appendix B for the ownership stake variable. 13, 14 Our Russell 
index reconstitution instruments are mostly significant with the F-statistics above critical values from 
a Stock-Yogo weak identification test. We use the methods outlined by Stock and Watson (2010) and 
Hall and Peixe (2003) to test the validity of our instruments and ensure that the relevancy condition is 
satisfied. In the remainder of our analysis, we use the fitted value of the holding stake variable from 
this first stage regression in Model 1 instead of the actual variable itself. 
The size of the target and of the voting firm may have a bearing on voting behavior. As all target 
firms are public, we control for the size of target firms by including the natural logarithm of the target 
firm’s market value of assets in the regressions. As a substantial fraction of voting firms are private, 
we control for their scale in our regressions by including the natural logarithm of the number of funds 
                                                 
13 During 2003-2013, we track 5,521 changes related to all firms across industries in our sample due to Russell 1000/2000 
reconstitutions as follows: 874 movements from the 1000 to the 2000 index, 760 switches from the 2000 to the 1000 index, 
1,672 new additions to the 2000 index, and 2,215 removals from the 2000 index, and we use each of these as (0,1) variables. 
The annual Russell 1000/2000 index reconstitutions directly affect our mutual fund targets as follows: 4 movements from the 
1000 to the 2000 index, 4 switches from the 2000 to the 1000 index, 2 new additions to the 2000 index, and 1 removal from 
the 2000 index. Some firms could be indirectly affected by index reconstitutions involving other firms that are held in the 
portfolio of the same institutions even if they are not directly affected by these changes. This happens because the weighting 
of a firm in the institution’s portfolio could be revised as a result of the changes in weighting of non-portfolio firms directly 
affected by an index reconstitution.  
14 The results of the regressions are consistent with our expectations. More specifically, when a stock drops out from the 
Russell 1000 index due to relatively poor performance, we can expect the numerator of holding stake (the value of the 
holding) to decrease while its denominator (the value of all holdings in the voting company’s stock portfolio) is largely 
unaffected. Thus the change in the holding stake is expected to be negative, and that is precisely what the slope coefficient in 
Model 1 (-0.5990, p-value=0.0422) confirms. The ownership stake, on the other hand, measures the proportion of the target 
company held by the voting company. As Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2015) point out, since the dollar amounts indexed to 
the Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 indices are comparable, institutions will tend to buy a stock moving from the bottom of 
the pecking order in the Russell 1000 universe to the top in the Russell 2000 one. This is consistent with the positive 
coefficient we observe in Model 2 (5.5419, p-value=0.0003). 
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that are managed by each voting firm as an explanatory variable in our regressions.15 To test whether 
the voting firm is private or public that conditions voting behavior, we also include public voting firm 
in our cross-industry regressions as a control variable. 
Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005) show evidence of word-of-mouth effects among institutional 
money managers. As these word-of-mouth effects are more likely to arise if money managers are 
geographically close, we include the dummy variable closeness, which is set to unity if the distance 
between the headquarters of the voting company and the headquarters of the target is less than 100 
miles and to zero otherwise.  
[Table 5] 
The results of our cross-industry regressions are presented in Table 5. The main independent 
variable of interest is own industry which tells us whether MFCs vote differently on own-industry 
targets. Across all specifications, own industry is significantly positive, which suggests that MFCs are 
biased when it comes to voting on other members of the same industry. The marginal effect of the 
own-industry dummy on the propensity to vote with management is 2.85 percentage points.16  As 
expected, MFCs vote more with management when ISS and management agree: the marginal effect of 
ISS agreeing with management on the propensity to vote with management is 54.12 percentage 
points. We also find that the influence of the ISS recommendation is smaller when the firm being 
voted on is an own-industry company.17  This is consistent with the notion that MFCs discount the ISS 
recommendation more when it comes to decision-making on their home turf. Holding stake is positive 
and significant as we would expect, indicating that firms with a greater amount invested in the target 
tend to believe more in the policies of management and are therefore more supportive of it in their 
voting behavior.18 We find that the public dummy variable is insignificant, which suggests that 
whether the voting firm is private or public has little impact on how it votes across all firms. 
                                                 
15 As we discuss in Section 2.1, fund manager discretion over the voting process depends on whether voting is centralized 
within the fund management organization. This in turn depends on how complex the organization is, which is a function of 
the number of funds it manages. It therefore makes sense to control for the voting company’s number of funds. 
16 We follow the procedure described in Manski and McFadden (1981) to estimate this marginal effect. 
17 We show that we also get a similar result when we regress the decision to vote with ISS on an own-industry dummy using 
the same sample of proposals as used in Table 5. The marginal effect of voting with ISS for own industry is 2.2% lower than 
that for other industries. We do not present these results here for brevity. 
18 We test for the possibility that fitted holding stake may have greater explanatory power when interacted with the own 
industry dummy. This may be because mutual fund companies vote more with management when the stakes are higher, 
16 
If MFCs vote more favorably on own-industry companies, then we would expect this support to 
increase further for more contentious proposals where their votes are likely to be more influential. To 
test whether this is the case we re-run the regressions of Table 5 Panel A including only contentious 
proposals, and the results of doing so are presented in Table 5 Panel B. In this table we define 
contentious proposals in various ways. In Model 1, these are those proposals where ISS is opposed to 
the management proposal concerned. In Model 2, these are “close-call” proposals where the 
percentage of “for” votes is between 25% and 75%. In Model 3, these are proposals where the level of 
non-mutual fund support is low and less than 50%. 
It is evident from Table 5 Panel B that irrespective of how we define contentious proposals, the 
own-industry effect is greater than for the sample as a whole. For the ISS’s against-management 
proposals, the marginal effect on the own-industry dummy rises to 4.05%. The marginal effect on the 
own-industry dummy rises to 4.42% for close-call votes and to 3.85% for low non-mutual fund 
support proposals. 
Cai, Garner, and Walkling (2009) highlight that even small changes in support for directors at the 
time of their election can have a large economic effect on their diligence. For example, they show 
that, even though the vast majority of board members are elected with over 90% shareholder support, 
“a 1% decrease in the compensation committee chair votes is associated with a reduction in 
unexplained CEO compensation by approximately $220,000 in the following year.”  Given the 
importance of director election results, we would expect MFCs to vote more supportively of own-
industry companies for proposals relating to the election of directors. Table 5 Panel B Model 4 shows 
the results of running our analysis exclusively for director elections. In this case, the marginal effect 
on the own-industry dummy rises to 5.00%, well above the 2.85% for the sample as a whole. 
Overall, the evidence presented in our cross-industry analysis suggests that clubbiness rather than 
rivalry explains how MFCs vote on their industry peers. In the following within-industry analysis 
section, we explore why this is the case. 
                                                                                                                                                        
especially for own-industry companies. However, when we include this interaction between the fitted holding stake and the 
own industry dummy, we find that it is statistically insignificant (coefficient=-0.0171, p-value=0.8632). When we include 
the interaction between unfitted holding stake and own industry we find that it is also statistically insignificant 
(coefficient=0.1221, p-value=0.3313).  
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4.3. Within-industry results 
We now focus on the behavior of MFCs when they vote on own-industry members only. We start by 
discussing potential influences on the voting decision in this context. First, consider the threat of 
retaliation. If the management of the target is voted against, they may retaliate by voting against the 
voting company in the future. Alternatively as the target and the voting company are in the same 
sector, the target can seek to retaliate against the voting company on other fronts.  
To proxy for these retaliation possibilities in our within-industry analyses, we proceed as follows. 
In the case of voting retaliation, as this is only possible if the voting company is public, we include a 
public voting company dummy variable. We would expect public voting companies to vote more 
generously toward management because of the fear of future retaliation. As the potential for 
retaliation by the target in the future is increasing in the stake the target has in the voting company, we 
also include this variable in our within-industry analysis and label it reciprocal stake. As the threat of 
marketplace retaliation by the target is greater the more the voting company and the target company 
compete, we include a measure of the degree to which the two companies compete labeled 
competitive threat. 
Competitive threat captures the extent to which the target company’s fund offerings overlap with 
those of the voting company and hence pose a threat to its revenues. For each Lipper investment 
objective that both voting and target MFCs have funds in, the measure involves calculating the 
product of two variables. The first is the proportion of the voting  MFC’s assets under management in 
that investment objective which is indicative of how important the objective is for the revenues of the 
voting MFC, and the second is the target MFC’s market share in that objective, which measures the 
threat posed by the target to the voting firm's revenues in that objective. The product of these two 
variables is then summed across Lipper objectives to generate our competitive threat variable, i.e. the 
average threat the target company presents to the voting company across investment objectives.19    
                                                 
19 Our measure is inspired by the competitiveness measure used by Wahal and Wang (2011), which, for all stocks held by an 
incumbent fund, divides the sum of the entrant fund’s holdings in these stocks by the fund’s total holdings. However, if we 
were to simply translate the Wahal and Wang measure into our setting, then a voted-on family with a large presence in just 
one of the objectives that the voting family has a presence in, could be considered a significant competitive threat to the 
voting family even if the importance of that objective to the voting family is minimal. As a numerical example,  if the voting 
company has 5% of its assets in objective A, 15% of its assets in objective B, and 80% of its assets in objective C and the 
target’s market shares in objectives A, B and C are 3%, 5%, and 10% respectively, then the competitive threat posed to the 
18 
The voting company's behavior today may also be influenced by its past actions. In particular, if 
the target was friendly toward the voting company in the past, this may be reciprocated by the voting 
company the next time around. To allow for this possibility, we include the variable friendly target 
which captures the percentage of the time that the target voted with the management of the voting 
company in the last voting season.  
When considering how same industry companies vote on each other, there are two additional 
influences on their voting behavior that stem from these companies being similar entities. First, they 
share common information. Second, they have common interests.20  To capture the degree to which 
MFCs have common information in our analysis, we measure how frequently they vote together on 
third parties (common information). We measure common interest when it comes to a given proposal 
by measuring whether today's voting company tabled a similar proposal last period.21  These variables 
capture the extent to which same industry companies make similar decisions and the extent to which 
the proposals being tabled are consistent with the voting company management’s behavior. 
Senior managers in the same industry are likely to be socially connected. Voting firms that have 
stronger social ties with target firms can be expected to vote more with the management of the target. 
To measure these ties we conduct a point-to-point analysis between voting and target firms using the 
BoardEx dataset which allows us to identify all the connections between senior executives (including 
some fund managers) and board members of any two companies. BoardEx defines social ties as an 
overlap in employment, board membership, education or social activities of two firms’ board 
members and top managers. We include a dummy variable social ties that is set to 1 if there is any 
connection between the target and voting company, and zero otherwise. 
                                                                                                                                                        
voting company by the target is equal to (for objective A) 0.05x0.03+ (for objective B) 0.15x0.05+ (for objective C) 0.8x 
0.1= 0.089, representing the target’s average market share across the voting company’s objectives. One concern is that the 
competitive threat variable is simply a proxy for the sizes of the voting and target companies. However, this is not the case. 
The correlation between this variable and the size of the target company is 0.08. Using the number of funds managed by the 
voting company as a measure of its scale, the correlation between the competitive threat and scale of the voting company is -
0.06.  
20 For example, Servaes and Tamayo (2013) argue that when a company is targeted by a takeover attempt, its industry peers 
likewise feel threatened. 
21 The variables friendly target, reciprocal stake and common interest can only be constructed if the firm doing the voting 
this period is public and therefore can be voted on.  
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For our within-industry analysis, in addition to the above variables we also include the same 
variables that we used to explain voting behavior in the cross-industry analysis. 
We first run our regressions for the full sample where both public and private voting firms vote on 
own-industry targets. We then run our within-industry regressions using public voting firms only. All 
regressions include voting company / proposal type and year fixed effects. 22 
[Table 6] 
The results of our regressions using the full sample of 14,554 votes by all voting firms are 
presented in the first three columns of Table 6. We find that public voting firm is positive and 
significant, which suggests that the threat of voting retaliation leads to voting more sympathetically 
with the management of the target. The marginal effect of public voting firm is a change in the 
probability of voting for management of 17.46 percentage points. 
It is natural to ask whether the reason why public firms vote more supportively in their own 
industry than do private firms is because they are more supportive of all firms in general. We 
therefore include a public voting firm dummy in our cross-industry regressions in Table 5 Panel A. 
We find that it is insignificant, which suggests that public firms’ generosity toward targets’ 
management is limited to their industry peers.  
Apart from retaliation via voting, the possibility of retaliation in the marketplace appears to be a 
determinant of voting behavior, as competitive threat is highly significant across specifications. This 
lends credence to the notion that fund companies are less likely to vote against the management of 
closer competitors out of concern about the damage these competitors may inflict in return.23 For the 
full sample the marginal effect of a one standard deviation change in competitive threat on the 
probability of voting with management is 1.59 percentage points.  
                                                 
22 The voting company / proposal type combination fixed effects are statistically significant in most cases. For example, in 
Model 3 of Table 6, 87% of the fixed effects are significant at the 5% level or below. This again confirms the value of 
including fixed effects in this format in our regressions. 
23 It should be recognized that competitive threat is a “threat” variable and that what drives its impact is not actually 
undertaking the threatened response but the possibility of doing so. As the competitive strategies suggested are essentially 
“nuclear options”, we would expect an extremely low frequency of these strategies. Indeed, given the severe effects of such 
confrontation on the parties involved, it would be surprising if their senior managers, all members of the same closely 
interlinked professional community, failed to avert it. When we look at the data we find that this is indeed the case. In fact, 
whether we phrase this in terms of the threat of retaliation or the expectation of reciprocation is largely a matter of 
semantics. Rather than considering that firms avoid withdrawing support from a competitor out of fear of retaliation, one can 
equally well consider that they support competitors out of the hope of reciprocation. 
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For the own-industry sample, the impact of ISS agreeing with management on the propensity to 
vote has a marginal effect of 24.85 percentage points. The marginal effect of ISS recommendations 
within the mutual fund industry is therefore less than half of the marginal effect across all industries. 
This is consistent with our conjecture that ISS recommendations are given less weight when they 
concern own-industry members. In addition, common information, which captures the information 
overlap between the voting firm and the target, is positively statistically significant. This indicates that 
the voting firm is more likely to vote with the management of the target when they generally share 
each other’s views. 
Since we can only observe friendly target, reciprocal stake, common interest and social ties if the 
voting firm is public and therefore can be voted on, we now examine the effect of these variables on 
the propensity to vote with management using the 1,677 votes by public voting firms.24 We present 
our regressions including these additional variables in the last two columns of Table 6.  
Our results show that in the case of voting by public MFCs, competitive threat has an 
economically much more substantial role to play than it does for the full set of within-mutual-fund-
industry votes and its marginal effect on the probability of voting with management is 10.18 
percentage points. Our public-only sample also allows us to test the role of social ties. We find that 
the marginal propensity to vote with management increases by 10.12 percentage points when the 
board members, fund managers, and senior executives of the voting and target firms are socially tied. 
25  
With the average holding and reciprocal stakes being only 0.19% and 0.65% respectively, why 
should it matter economically how mutual funds vote on their rivals, and how the rivals vote in 
response? Model 5 of Table 6 sheds light on this. Despite the small size of stakes MFCs have in each 
other, friendly target and reciprocal stake are both statistically significant and have marginal effects 
of 10.16 percentage points and 2.51 percentage points, respectively, on voting with management for 
one standard deviation increases in their values.  
                                                 
24 We only use social ties when the voting firm is public, because BoardEx’s coverage is less comprehensive for private 
firms. If we include social ties in our cross-industry regressions (which also include private voting firms), this variable does 
not attain statistical significance in any specifications. 
25 We measure social ties as a dummy variable in Table 6 for ease of interpretation. We could instead include social ties as a 
continuous variable. When we do so, we find that this has little effect on our results. The coefficient on the continuous social 
ties variable is 0.0448 (p-value = 0.0106). 
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It may be argued that the reason why MFCs support each other is because they have similar 
information sets and they have a preference for the type of proposals tabled by the target. Our 
variables common interest and common information control for these possibilities. We find that public 
voting firm, competitive threat, reciprocal stake, and social ties are statistically significant. This tells 
us that fear of retaliation and social ties are drivers of the way mutual funds vote on each other above 
and beyond their common interest and common information.  
In our data set, there are six instances of single tit-for-tat behavior and six instances of back-to-
back tit-for-tat actions.26  We believe that we find so few instances of retaliation because the threat of 
retaliation is credible. In fact, our evidence is consistent with the mutual fund industry being largely in 
a mutually supportive equilibrium – at least when it comes to the way it votes. While Wahal and 
Wang (2011) find evidence of mutual fund families engaging in competition in the product market, 
they do so in the expectation of gaining market share. In the case of voting, however, a voting firm’s 
cost-benefit tradeoff is heavily skewed in the direction of supporting the target management: the costs 
of antagonizing a rival can be high, while the benefits rather indirect and uncertain.  
4.4. The economic significance of the own-industry voting effect 
We have shown that, all else equal, fund companies support their peer companies’ management 3 
percentage points more often than they support the management of other companies. Given that 
typical support for management is on the order of 90%, is the additional 3 percentage point support 
economically meaningful?   
To put this quantity in perspective, let us focus on overall shareholder support of management 
actions. Specifically, we rank firms by the percentage support their management received during our 
sample period. We find that the 25th percentile garnered 90.28% support; the median firm, 93.32% 
support; and the 75th percentile, 95.44% support. Thus, losing 3 percentage point support is enough to 
                                                 
26 Six instances of single tit-for-tat behavior include Franklin Resources against BlackRock in 2006, Janus Capital against 
BlackRock in 2006, BlackRock against T Rowe Price in 2007 and 2012, BlackRock against Franklin Resources in 2011, and 
BlackRock against Janus Capital in 2012 after being voted against in the previous year. We also observe six instances of 
back-to-back tit-for-tat actions: 1) BlackRock voted against T Rowe Price in 2006 and 2008 while being voted against by T 
Rowe Price in 2007; 2) Legg Mason voted against T Rowe Price in 2006 and 2008 while being voted against by T Rowe 
Price in 2007; 3) Legg Mason voted against T Rowe Price in 2006 and 2008 while being voted against by T Rowe Price in 
2007; 4) Legg Mason voted against BlackRock in 2010 and 2008 while being voted against by T Rowe Price in 2009; 5) T 
Rowe Price voted against Janus Capital in 2013 and 2011 while being voted against by Janus Capital in 2012; 6) T Rowe 
Price voted against Calamos in 2013 and 2011 while being voted against by Calamos in 2012. 
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demote a firm in the top quartile according to its management’s popularity with shareholders, to the 
bottom half. Conversely, gaining 3 percentage point support can lift unpopular management – one in 
the bottom quartile by shareholder support – almost to the middle of the popularity ranking. Thus, 
given that investor opposition to management proposals is a highly visible gauge of management’s 
perceived quality, a 3 percentage point difference in shareholder support is, indeed, quite significant 
economically. 
A large number of our proposals deal with the election of directors. One reason why this 
additional 3 percentage point voting “cushion” is important is that it causes directors to make less 
effort in their monitoring role as they are more likely to be re-nominated whatever they do. To 
demonstrate this, in Table 7 Panel A we regress whether a director is re-nominated at the end of her 
term on the proportion of votes that a director receives when she is originally elected. We include the 
standard control variables that are used in the literature together with year fixed effects. The table 
shows that directors who receive greater own-industry support due to their company’s stock being 
held more by other MFCs are more likely to be nominated for election in the future. This effect is 
non-trivial. A one standard deviation increase in total ownership by other MFCs leads to a 4.36 
percentage point increase in the probability of the same director being re-nominated when her term 
ends. Given that the unconditional probability of directors failing to be re-nominated is 26%, this 
indicates that own-industry support has a substantial effect on the likelihood that a director is re-
nominated. 
Directors who know they are likely to be re-nominated in the future may exert little effort in their 
current role. In this case, we would expect the market to react more negatively to directors of MFCs a 
higher proportion of whose shares are held by other MFCs, as these target firms have a larger voting 
‘cushion’. To test this, we measure the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in the three days 
surrounding the voting day of all directors. We control for director and firm characteristics and 
include time fixed effects. Table 7 Panel B shows that CARs are significantly more negative as the 
level of own-industry support rises. This effect is economically material. A one standard deviation 
increase in the total ownership of a MFC by other MFCs leads to a 0.44 percentage point decrease in 
the target’s CARs on the voting day. Since the mean market value of equity of the sample of MFCs is 
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$14.15 billion, this roughly corresponds to a decrease of $62 million over three days around the 
voting date. 
A key responsibility of directors is to monitor senior management. To examine if directors 
monitor senior management less due to the own-industry effect, we examine CEO compensation and 
turnover. We would expect that directors from MFCs that are most supported by other MFCs will 
monitor CEOs less, which should result in greater CEO compensation and lower CEO turnover.  
In Table 7 Panel C, we regress whether the CEO departs in the next voting season on the level of 
own-industry voting support and we also include in the regression CEO and firm characteristics along 
with time fixed effects. Our results show that CEO turnover is significantly decreasing in the level of 
own-industry support. A one standard deviation increase in the fraction of a mutual fund firm held by 
other MFCs leads to a 1.73 percentage point decrease in CEO turnover probability. This is non-trivial 
given that the unconditional probability of CEO turnover in our MFC sample is 6.72%. 
If directors make less effort, then they will be less constraining on CEO compensation. To 
investigate this, we measure CEO excess compensation as the residual from the first stage regression 
of the log of the CEO’s salary and bonus on the log of market cap, the prior three-year returns and the 
two-digit SIC industry codes and annual fixed effects as in Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004). In 
Table 7 Panel D, we regress CEO excess compensation on the level of voting support from other 
MFCs based on their total ownership of the company concerned. Our results show that CEO excess 
compensation is significantly higher for firms that are more supported by their peers in the mutual 
fund industry. A one standard deviation increase in total ownership by other MFCs leads to a 7.06 
percentage point increase in CEO excess compensation. We do not find similar effects for removals of 
classified board and poison pills, or even for firm performance. 
It may be argued that if MFCs know a CEO is likely to perform well that they will take a larger 
stake in the MFC she works for when that CEO is hired. This could cause both CEO compensation to 
rise and CEO turnover to fall. To address this endogeneity problem we instrument for the ownership 
stake using the same approach used in section 4.2 which involves regressing the changes in ownership 
stake on exogenous Russell index reconstitutions. We then re-run all tests in Table 7 using the fitted 
ownership stake obtained from the first stage regression in Model 2 of Appendix B in our tests and 
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these are presented in the second column of each panel in Table 7. We continue to find an 
economically significant effect of own-industry support on the diligence of directors.27 
To summarize, MFCs that are more supported by other MFCs, have directors that are more likely 
to be nominated in the future. As a result they need to exert less effort in their roles as directors. We 
show that CEO turnover is lower and CEO compensation is higher where directors are more 
supported by other MFCs, consistent with the notion that such directors are less effective monitors. 
The impact of this is to lower the value of MFCs and we demonstrate that as own-industry support 
rises, abnormal returns earned at the time of director elections decrease. This suggests that the own-
industry voting effect runs against the fiduciary interests of mutual fund investors. 
5. Evidence on own-sector voting by other types of financial institutions 
We have used data on mutual fund voting to test whether there is evidence of conflicts of interest in 
the way MFCs vote on corporate proposals. Our results show that MFCs vote more sympathetically 
towards other MFCs. This tells us that these companies may be unable to provide effective 
governance over their own-industry members. If the governance of MFCs is compromised by the fact 
that much of their equity is held by industry peers, is a similar concern warranted in the case of other 
investment managers, as well as banks and insurers?  
Although data on how these other types of financial institutions vote is generally unavailable, we 
have three pieces of information that allow us to shed light on whether the self-governance of the 
financial sector as a whole is compromised. First, for each proposal, we know the proportion of votes 
that support management. Second, we know if the target is a financial company or not. Third, we can 
calculate what proportion of the target is held by banks, insurers and investment managers. These data 
are available from the 13F holdings database.  
With this information, we run the following regression across all proposals in our sample. 
Proportion of votes in favor of management i = b0 + b1 Proportion ownership financial i  
                                                 
27 Alternatively, we could measure total mutual fund voting support for the target MFC using only the shares that are owned 
by all voting MFCs in the target MFC and that were voted in support of management in the previous year, while still 
controlling for the proportion of “for” votes. When we use this new variable instead of total ownership by all voting MFCs 
in the target MFC, the results are qualitatively similar. The coefficients on this key variable in Model 1 of Table 7 Panels A, 
B, C, and D are 0.1661 (p-value=0.0001), -0.1010 (p-value=0.0005), -0.0147 (p-value=0.0101), and -1.3485 (p-
value=0.0003), respectively. 
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+ b2 Financial target i + b3 Financial target i × Proportion ownership financial i  
+ b4 Confidential voting i+ b5 Social ties i + b6 Average distance i + Controls + ɛ 
 Following Besley and Preston (2007), we use the log-odds transformation of the proportion of 
votes – in our case, those in favor of management of company i – as the dependent variable in the 
regression. Proportion ownership financial i is the proportion of shares of security i that is held by 
financial companies. Financial target i is a dummy variable that is one if the target company is a 
financial company.  
The coefficient b2 in this regression tells us whether the proportion of stock i held by financial 
companies affects the propensity to vote with management differently if the target is a financial 
company. If the coefficient b2 is positively statistically significant, we would interpret it as evidence 
of clubbiness.  
In addition, we include a confidential voting dummy variable that is set to one if the company 
being voted on has adopted confidential voting, which means that its management does not have 
access to shareholder-level voting decisions. If shareholders are worried about retaliation as is 
suggested by our previous analysis then we would expect that they would vote more against 
management in the case of confidential voting, as in this case there is no chance of retaliation. We did 
not include confidential voting in our prior mutual fund-level analyses as mutual fund voting, since 
2003, is public information and therefore the issue of confidential voting is not relevant. We use 
exactly the same social ties dummy variable based on the BoardEx dataset as used in the previous 
section as an additional determinant of voting behavior and we would expect greater social ties to lead 
to more voting support. We include ownership-weighted average distance between the voting 
companies and the target as a control variable. The distance between any two companies is based on 
the distance between the headquarters of the two companies. For non-US companies, distance is 
measured from the US headquarters of the companies concerned.28 
                                                 
28 We also try interacting the social ties dummy with the confidential voting dummy. The effect of the interaction of social 
ties and confidentiality is harder to predict. On the one hand, social ties can lead to the disclosure of voting behavior through 
informal channels so that formal confidentiality no longer matters, making the interaction effect positive. On the other hand, 
confidentiality can relieve the greater pressure to support management that is inherent in the presence of social ties, making 
the interaction effect negative. When we add the interaction effect to the second regression of Table 8, the interaction effect 
is indeed negative and significant at the 1% level, consistent with the latter explanation. 
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We use a number of control variables including the size of the target company and the industry 
adjusted return of the target in the previous 12 months. We also include proposal type and time fixed 
effects. As our observations in this test are at the proposal level, not the vote level, we cluster standard 
errors by proposal type and year. The results of our regressions are presented in Table 8.  
[Table 8] 
The coefficient on proportion of shares owned by financial firms (b1) is negative and significant 
which indicates that financial firms are less supportive of management than are other parties voting. 
This could be because they have a stricter voting policy. The coefficient on financial firm target (b2) 
is negative and significant which indicates that financial firms as a whole get fewer votes from all 
parties. Note that this coefficient does not capture how financial companies are voting on other 
financial companies but instead captures how all parties are voting on all financial companies. What 
sheds light on how financial companies are voting on other financial companies is the interaction (b3) 
between the proportion of shares owned by financial firms in the target and the financial firm target 
dummy. The positive and significant coefficient on this interaction tells us that while financial firms 
are more severe in their voting than are other voting parties, they are significantly less severe in their 
voting when it comes to voting on other financial firms.  
As expected, when confidential voting is in place, voting parties are less worried about retaliation 
and therefore are less supportive of management. In addition, we find that firms that have stronger 
social ties with their shareholding companies find it easier to get their proposals passed. When the 
physical distance between voting companies and their targets is greater, this is likely to lead to fewer 
personal interactions, causing the level of voting support for target companies to be lower. This is 
indeed what we find in Table 8 as the coefficient on the average distance (b6) between the voting and 
target companies is significantly negative. 
These results together with the earlier results on MFCs tell us that the financial sector as a whole 
has an own-industry bias when it comes to voting on its own kind. As financial companies hold a 
large fraction of other financial companies, own-industry bias may have a substantial detrimental 
effect on the corporate governance of the financial services sector.  
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6. Robustness  
In this section, we perform a number of tests to examine the robustness of our findings reported in the 
previous sections. 
6.1. Uncontentious votes 
It may be argued that if voting parties see the voting outcome as being a foregone conclusion, this 
may affect their level of engagement with the voting process. To investigate this further, we exclude 
12,246 votes with a pass rate of more than 95%, our results continue to hold. Specifically, in Table 6 
Model 3, the coefficients for the competitive threat and public voting firm variable are significant at 
the 5% and 1% level, respectively. When we drop 13,029 votes with a pass rate of more than 90%, the 
coefficients for these two variables remain significant at the 1% level.  
6.2. Non-mutual fund votes 
The way MFCs vote may be affected by their beliefs regarding how other parties will vote. Naturally 
we are unable to observe these beliefs. We use the actual way that all other parties voted to proxy for 
these beliefs under the assumption of rational expectations and include this information as a control 
variable in our tests. For the cross-industry regression, doing so has the additional advantage that if 
the corporate governance quality of MFCs is in some way different from that of all other companies 
then including how other parties vote will control for this. When we include this variable in both our 
within-industry and cross-industry tests, we find that this variable is insignificant at conventional 
levels and our results remain unaffected. This does not mean that non-mutual funds treat MFCs 
differently to the way they treat all other companies. Rather, it indicates that the way non-mutual fund 
shareholders vote does not have a significant bearing on the way MFCs vote. 
6.3. Clustered standard errors 
In all tests presented in Tables 5 and 6 of the paper, we double cluster our standard errors by voting 
company and proposal type. This assumes that the errors are correlated across MFCs for the same 
proposal type and across voting decisions by the same MFC. As a robustness test, we also cluster by 
proposal, which assumes that the errors are correlated for a specific proposal. For example, if all 
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MFCs are voting on amending an omnibus stock plan for BlackRock, then we assume that the way 
they vote will be correlated. All results continue to hold if we cluster standard errors by proposal.  
6.4. Alternative matching procedures 
In the cross-industry section of the paper we match votes by MFCs on other MFCs to votes by MFCs 
on firms outside the fund industry. These matching votes are votes by the same MFC on the same 
proposal type but with the target of the vote being a company outside the mutual fund industry with 
the closest size to the original MFC. To examine how sensitive our results are to the matching 
procedure used we also match by holding stake instead of size and our results are qualitatively similar. 
The coefficient on the own industry variable is 0.3807 with a p-value of 0.0001. We also match along 
the dimensions of size and holding stake together (we find firms that are within 10% of the size and 
with the closest holding stake) and our results are also qualitatively similar. The coefficient on the 
own industry variable is 0.4230 with a p-value of 0.0001. 
6.5 Cross-industry results using the entire sample 
Instead of using a matching procedure for our cross-industry tests, we also consider using the entire 
sample of votes for our analysis. The problem with this, however, is that it is not feasible to run 
logistic regressions for the full sample because of the large sample size (9,834,758 observations) and 
the large number of fixed effects (46,037 (investing MFC × proposal type) fixed effects, 69 two-digit-
SIC industry fixed effects, and 10 year fixed effects). We therefore follow other recent papers on fund 
voting (Calluzzo and Kedia, 2014; Dimmock, Gerken, Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 2014; Schwarz-Ziv 
and Wermers, 2014) by using a linear Model in this setting. When we run tests using ordinary least 
squares regressions with the same variables and clustering method as used in Table 5 Panel A Model 
2, we find that the coefficient on the own industry variable is 0.0300 with a p-value of 0.0001, which 
implies that the marginal effect of the own-industry dummy remains at 3 percentage points.  
7. Conclusions 
The recent financial crisis has been blamed in part on the poor governance of the financial sector. The 
main owners of financial company stocks are other financial institutions, which collectively makes the 
financial sector responsible for its own governance. Are financial firms able to perform this self-
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governance function in accordance with their fiduciary duty or are they swayed by their self-interests?   
This is the question that we seek to address in this paper. As proxy voting is an important part of the 
governance process and voting is not observable for other types of financial institution, we use the 
testing ground of mutual fund voting to do so. 
When we compare how MFCs vote on other MFCs with how they vote on firms from outside 
their own industry, we find evidence that they tend to favor their own. To understand why this is the 
case we focus on what determines how MFCs vote on each other. We find that the fear of retaliation 
and the level of social ties have an important bearing on their voting behavior.  
We demonstrate that one important consequence of greater own-industry support is that directors 
in MFCs that are more held than other MFCs tend to monitor senior management less. This director 
underperformance has marked valuation consequences as abnormal returns earned at director 
elections are significantly decreasing in the extent to which MFCs are held by their peers. This 
suggests that the own-industry effect may be causing fund companies to deviate from their fiduciary 
duty. Institutional investors are required to make public their policies for dealing with material 
conflicts of interest they may have with regard to their portfolio firms. Our results imply that the 
definition of ‘material conflicts’ should include not only business dealings between the voter and the 
target, but also competitive interaction between them.  
To extend our findings, we then examine whether financial companies defined more broadly also 
vote more favorably when it comes to their peers, and find it to be so. Overall our results reveal 
deficiencies in the financial sector’s ability to govern itself. As retaliation/reciprocation appears to be 
driving these results, this points to the need to require financial firms to adopt confidential voting. 
In spite of intense interest in decision-making within the financial sector, we are not aware of 
other research into what amounts to the sector’s self-governance. The present paper is a first step in 
this regard. While we focus on shareholder voting, governance can of course be exercised through a 
variety of formal and informal channels. We believe that financial firms’ uniqueness in that their 
shares are largely in the hands of peer firms is an intriguing and important point of departure for 
understanding financial firms’ governance. 
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Appendix A. List of target and investing MFCs in the sample 
 
In order to obtain a historical set of listed US companies involved in asset management and related activities, we interrogate 
the Compustat segment database going back to 1978 for the following primary NAICS codes: 523110, 523120, 523920, 
523930, 525910, or 525990. We then use the business segment names (SNAME field) to identify segments corresponding, 
as purely as possible, to asset management. After examining the data, we settled on the following algorithm. A segment is 
deemed to be in the asset management business if its name   includes the text ‘fund’ or ‘institutional invest’; or  includes the text ‘manage’, ‘mangement’ (sic), ‘mgmt’, or ‘mgt’ together with the text ‘asset’, ‘invest’, ‘invt’, 
‘ivest’ (sic), or ‘money’; or  includes the text ‘invest’ and ‘advi’; and  does not include the text ‘acquisition’, ‘alternative’, ‘broker’, ‘consolidation’, ‘economic’, ‘elimination’, ‘hedge’, 
‘lending’, ‘mortgage’, ‘private equity’, ‘securities’, ‘wealth’. 
We then calculate the proportion of aggregate net sales (after excluding any segments with negative net sales) that are due to 
segments meeting the criteria above. If the proportion averages more than 0.7 over two consecutive years, the following year 
the firm enters our sample.  
 
List of target MFCs in the sample 
 
BlackRock, Inc. 
Calamos Asset Management, Inc. 
Cohen & Steers, Inc. 
Epoch Holding Corporation 
Franklin Resources, Inc. 
Janus Capital Group Inc. 
Legg Mason, Inc. 
Neuberger Berman Inc. 
T. Rowe Price Group, Inc. 
Virtus Investment Partners, Inc. 
Waddell & Reed Financial, Inc. 
 
List of investing MFCs in the sample 
 
AIM Management Group, Inc. 
Allianz Funds 
American Century Investment Management 
Artisan Partners LP 
BAMCO, Inc. 
BB&T Asset Management, Inc. 
BNY Investment Advisors 
BlackRock, Inc. 
Bridges Investment Management 
Bridgeway Capital Management 
Burnham Asset Management Corp 
Calamos Asset Management, Inc. 
Century Capital Management, LLC 
Charles Schwab Investment Management 
Claymore Advisors, LLC 
Cohen & Steers, Inc 
Dalton, Greiner, Hartman, Maher & Co. 
Davis Advisers 
Dimensional Fund Advisors, Inc 
Eaton Vance Management, Inc. 
Evergreen Investment Management 
F.L. Putnam Investment Management 
Fenimore Asset Management, Inc 
Fidelity Management  
Fiduciary Asset Management, LLC 
Fifth Third Asset Management, 
Franklin Resources, Inc. 
Fred Alger Management, Inc. 
Gardner Lewis Asset Management 
Gartmore Funds 
Grantham, Mayo, Van Otterloo  
HSBC Asset Management  
Harbor Funds 
ING Investment Management Co 
IXIS Asset Management 
Intrepid Capital Management Inc 
JPMorgan Asset Management, Inc 
Janus Capital Group Inc. 
Jennison Associates LLC 
Jensen Investment Management 
John Hancock Funds, LLC 
Keeley Asset Management Corp 
Kinetics Asset Management, Inc 
Kirr, Marbach & Company, LLC 
Legg Mason, Inc 
Loomis, Sayles & Co. LP 
Lord Abbett & Co. LLC 
Managers Investment Group LLC 
Mason Street Advisors, LLC 
Massachusetts Financial Services 
Meeder Asset Management, Inc. 
Munder Capital Management 
Mutual of America Capital Management 
Nationwide Fund Advisors 
Natixis Asset Management Advisors 
Navellier & Associates, Inc 
Neuberger Berman Inc 
Nicholas Company, Inc. 
Northeast Management & Researcch 
Northern Trust Global Investment 
Old Mutual Funds 
Olstein Capital Management 
OppenheimerFunds, Inc. 
Optique Capital Management, In 
Pacific Heights Asset Management 
Pax World Management Corp 
Phoenix Investment Partners, LLC 
Pioneer Investments 
PowerShares Capital Management 
ProFund Advisors LLC 
ProShare Advisors LLC 
Profit Investment Management 
Prospector Partners Asset Management 
Putnam Investment Management 
Quantitative Management Associates 
Rafferty Asset Management, LLC 
Reynolds Capital Management 
RiverSource Investments LLC 
Robert W. Baird & Co. Inc 
Rochdale Investment Management 
Rodney Square Management Corp 
Roxbury Capital Management, LLC 
Royce & Associates LLC 
Russell Investment Group 
Rydex Investments 
Schroder Investment Management 
Sit Investment Associates, Inc 
State Street Global Advisors 
Summit Investment Partners, Inc 
T. Rowe Price Group, Inc. 
TCW Asset Management Co. 
TFS Capital LLC 
TIAA-CREF Asset Management LLC 
Thornburg Investment Management 
Thrivent Investment Management 
UBS Global Asset Management 
USAA Funds 
VTL Associates, LLC 
Value Line, Inc. 
Vanguard Group, Inc. 
Voyageur Asset Management Inc 
WM Funds 
Wasatch Advisors 
Wells Capital Management, Inc. 
Wells Fargo Funds Management 
William Blair Capital Manageme 
Wilshire Associates Inc 
Wintergreen Advisers, LLC 
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Appendix B. First stage Model of the change in holding stakes and ownership stakes by institutions  
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Variables Dependent variable:  Holding stake Dependent variable:  Ownership stake 
Intercept 2.6898*** 2.3504 
 (0.0001) (0.2918) 
Russell index inclusion of portfolio firm   
Russell 1000 t-1  Russell 2000 t (0,1) -0.5990** 5.4519*** 
 (0.0422) (0.0003) 
Russell 2000 t-1  No index t (0,1) -0.1178 13.4223*** 
 (0.6864) (0.0002) 
Russell 2000 t-1  Russell 1000 t (0,1) 0.7777*** -8.7599*** 
 (0.0036) (0.0001) 
No index t-1  Russell 2000 t (0,1) -0.1143 -11.7563*** 
 (0.6853) (0.0001)  Ranking in Russell ( t-1 , t ) -0.0037*** -0.0171*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0003) 
[  Ranking in Russell ( t-1 , t ) ] 2 -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0003) 
Portfolio firm characteristics   
Size -0.3848*** -0.4276* 
 (0.0001) (0.0503) 
Q -0.0014** 0.0046*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0008) 
Industry adjusted return 0.0138 -0.0015 
 (0.1346) (0.8647) 
Industry adjusted return (lagged one year) 0.0122 -0.0906*** 
 (0.2533) (0.0051) 
Volatility 0.4033 40.9851*** 
 (0.5739) (0.0001) 
Liquidity 0.7037*** -12.2783*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0009) 
Price Earnings ratio 0.0005 0.0060** 
 (0.2293) (0.0133) 
N 4,443,242 4,443,242 
Regression’s  p-value  0.0001 0.0001 
Notes. This table reports first stage regressions of the changes in holding stakes and ownership stakes by institutions upon 
the Russell index reconstitutions similar to those in Schmidt (2012) and Fich, Harford, and Tran (2015). Holding stake is the 
proportion of the value of the institution’s portfolio represented by the portfolio firm’s shares. Ownership stake is the 
proportion of sole voting authority shares (out of the total number of shares outstanding) of the portfolio firm held by the 
institution. Both holding stake and ownership stake are measured at the end of each quarter in year t during 2003-2013 from 
the 13F database. We multiply the dependent variables by 10,000 for regression reporting purpose in both models. We 
measure the changes in holding stakes and ownership stakes from the end of the third quarter in year t-1 to the third quarter 
in year t. Russell 1000 t-1  Russell 2000 t (0,1) equals one if the portfolio firm moves from the Russell 1000 to the Russell 
2000. Russell 2000 t-1  No index t (0,1) equals one if the portfolio firm moves out of the Russell 2000 to below the top 
3000. Russell 2000 t-1  Russell 1000 t (0,1) equals one if the portfolio firm moves from the Russell 2000 to the Russell 
1000. No index t-1  Russell 2000 t (0,1) equals one if the portfolio firm moves to the Russell 2000 from below the top 3000.  Ranking in Russell (t-1, t) is the change in the portfolio firm’s ranking in the Russell from time t-1 to t. Both regressions 
control for industry and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by institution. We report p-values in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics of investing and target MFCs 
 Investing MFCs  Target MFCs 
 Public Private Public 
Number of companies 17 91  11 
Market capitalization (US$ billion)     Mean 24.61   14.15 
                                                             Median 12.43   14.92 
Number of funds                                  Mean 11.93 6.63  12.86 
                                                             Median 9 4  10 
Notes. This table reports the summary statistics of listed MFCs being voted during 2004-2013 and those of investing MFCs 
that cast votes during the same period. We use voting data from ISS. Market capitalization is the common share price 
multiplied by total number of shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year from Compustat. The statistics are averaged 
across voting years. 
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of stakes in MFCs 
Panel A: Institutional ownership in target MFCs 
Ownership  (% of shares outstanding) Mean Q1 Median Q3 
Bank trusts 6.46 1.49 4.25 6.02 
Insurance companies 3.03 1.47 2.09 4.06 
Mutual fund companies 18.87 13.33 18.29 24.20 
Other investment companies and advisors 14.24 6.37 12.97 18.40 
Corporate (private) pension funds 0.42 0.08 0.14 0.26 
Public pension funds 1.66 0.58 1.62 2.49 
University and foundation endowments 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.09 
Miscellaneous 2.01 0.35 0.74 2.34 
Others 1.46 0.04 0.80 2.01
Panel B: Stakes between investing MFCs and target MFCs 
 Mean Q1 Median Q3 
Holding stake (%) 0.2350 0.0115 0.0507 0.1597 
Ownership stake (%) 0.3118 0.1621 0.2098 0.3782 
Reciprocal stake (%) 0.6837 0.0435 0.2754 0.8170 
Notes. Panel A reports the summary statistics of ownership by different stakeholders in target MFCs. Ownership is the 
number of shares owned by each group of institutions, expressed as a percentage of total shares outstanding. We use 
Bushee’s (1998) investment type classification and our identification of MFCs from the ISS voting data to aggregate 
ownership by institutional type across firm-years. Panel B reports the summary statistics of stakes between investing and 
target MFCs. Holding stake is the percentage of the value of the investing MFC’s portfolio represented by the target MFC’s 
shares. Ownership stake is the percentage of sole voting authority shares (out of the total number of shares outstanding) of 
the target MFC held by the voting MFC. Reciprocal stake is the percentage of sole voting authority shares (out of the total 
number of shares outstanding) of the investing MFC held by the target MFC, which is measurable only when the investing 
MFC is publicly traded. 
 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics of proposals voted by MFCs  
Type Description Number of proposals Number of votes
M0101 Ratify Auditors 66 1,523 
M0125 Other Business 7 189
M0126 Amend Articles/Bylaws/Charter-Non-Routine 4 45 
M0201 Elect Director 465 11,474 
M0215 Declassify the Board of Directors 2 58 
M0304 Increase Authorized Common Stock 2 46 
M0306 Increase Authorized Preferred and Common Stock 2 22 
M0405 Approve Merger Agreement 2 13 
M0512 Amend Qualified Employee Stock Purchase Plan 2 33 
M0522 Approve Omnibus Stock Plan 5 76 
M0524 Amend Omnibus Stock Plan 13 211 
M0526 Amend Non-Employee Director Stock Option Plan 1 10
M0535 Approve/Amend Executive Incentive Bonus Plan 13 249 
M0548 Approve Repricing of Options 1 9 
M0550 Advisory Vote to Ratify Named Executive Officers' Compensation 20 526 
M0598 Approve Non-Employee Director Omnibus Stock Plan 2 59 
M0605 Adopt/Increase Supermajority Vote Requirement for Amendment 1 11 
 Total 608 14,554 
Notes. This table reports the types of proposals voted at MFCs on other MFCs in the same industry during 2004-2013.  
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Table 4 Vote outcome on proposals voted at MFCs vs. non MFCs  
Panel A: Votes cast and proportion with management 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 All 
Mutual fund industry        
Number of votes  386 520 1,281 1,403 1,543 1,562 1,647 2,143 2,126 1,943 14,554 
% of votes cast with management  89.06 88.46 86.96 92.87 95.20 96.80 94.35 92.53 91.20 97.94 93.31 
Other industries        
Number of votes  392,781 428,025 989,622 1,035,208 1,083,311 1,227,229 1,237,202 1,230,927 1,263,085 932,814 9,820,204 
% of votes cast with management  89.52 91.02 91.27 91.83 92.51 88.78 86.26 90.61 90.62 90.88 90.24
            
Panel B: Proposals voted and passed 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 All 
Mutual fund industry        
Number of proposals voted 48 56 59 56 66 61 61 64 65 72 608 
% of proposals passed 93.62 98.21 83.05 98.21 98.49 98.36 98.36 96.88 98.46 98.61 96.22 
Other industries        
Number of proposals voted 22,230 19,984 20,346 20,124 20,140 19,885 17,897 18,912 18,352 15,569 193,439 
% of proposals passed 78.22 88.61 90.65 84.39 87.61 95.67 95.27 96.47 96.35 95.74 90.51 
   
Panel C: Univariate tests of pass rate and proportion of votes cast with management in the mutual fund industry vs. other industries 
 
Mutual fund industry 
(1)
Other industries  
(2)
48 Fama French industries (excluding mutual fund) Difference  
(1) – (2) t stat z statMin Q1 Q2 Q3 Max
% of votes cast with management 93.31 90.24 79.97 88.78 90.37 91.46 93.14 3.07 14.84*** 12.47*** 
% of proposals passed  96.22 90.51 79.96 89.46 90.75 92.05 94.24 5.71 7.35*** 4.80*** 
% of proposals passed at least 60% support 95.89 90.01 79.86 89.05 90.30 91.53 93.88 5.88 7.27*** 4.83*** 
% of proposals passed at least 70% support 95.23 89.20 79.44 88.22 89.55 90.22 93.08 6.03 6.95*** 4.79*** 
% of proposals passed at least 80% support 94.41 87.69 75.75 86.34 87.69 88.59 90.34 6.72 7.18*** 5.04*** 
% of proposals passed at least 90% support 91.61 84.14 72.58 82.46 84.31 85.39 87.85 7.47 6.62*** 5.04*** 
           
Notes. This table reports the summary statistics of all votes cast by MFCs on proposals at MFCs and portfolio firms outside the mutual fund industry during 2004-2013. We aggregate votes by 
funds within a family using the method in Davis and Kim (2007) and Ashraf et al. (2011). We create a dummy variable vote with management that equals one if the majority of the funds in a 
fund family support a proposal and zero otherwise. Panel C presents t-statistics and z-statistics that test whether there is a significant difference in votes cast with management and proposal pass 
rates between the mutual fund industry and all the 48 Fama and French industries, based on the Fama and French (1997) classifications. 
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Table 5 The probability of voting with target management’s recommendation across industries 
Panel A: All votes 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 3.9541 3.5897 -6.2152*** -6.2615*** 
(0.9691) (0.9676) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Own industry (0,1) 0.3101*** 0.3093*** 0.8423*** 0.8408*** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
ISS recommendation = management (0,1) x Own industry (0,1)  -1.3541*** -1.3509*** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) 
ISS recommendation = management (0,1) 6.4709*** 6.4691*** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) 
Closeness (0,1) 0.1934*  0.0809 
(0.0838)  (0.6057)
Holding stake  0.0759**  0.0107* 
  (0.0133)  (0.0895) 
Public voting firm (0,1) -34.7591 -31.0676 -22.1417 -22.3921 
(0.9785) (0.9779) (0.9832) (0.9804) 
ln(Voting firm’s number of funds) 0.3876*** 0.4027*** 0.1565** 0.1568**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0230) (0.0245) 
Target firm’s prior year industry adjusted return  0.0844 0.0630 -0.0184 -0.0169 
(0.3315) (0.4707) (0.8801) (0.8898) 
ln(Target firm’s assets) 0.0910*** 0.0999*** 0.1169*** 0.1204*** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
N 29108 29108 29108 29108 
Pseudo R2 0.3133 0.3140 0.4303 0.4325 
Regression’s  p-value  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 
Panel B: Votes on contentious proposals 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
ISS against 
management 
votes 
Close-      
call  
votes 
Low non-
mutual fund 
support votes 
Director 
election  
votes 
Own industry (0,1) 0.2769** 0.9186*** 0.4365*** 0.7470*** 
(0.0105) (0.0001) (0.0041) (0.0001) 
Other controls as in Panel A Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2124 678 1816 22948 
Pseudo R2 0.1872 0.1525 0.1629 0.2338 
Regression’s  p-value 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Notes. In this table, we report logistic regressions modeling the probability of investing MFCs voting with target company’s 
management recommendations during 2004-2013. The sample includes all mutual fund industry votes and a matched sample 
of non-mutual fund industry votes. In Panel A, we select the matched votes cast from the same voting company, in the same 
voting season, on the same proposal type, and on the target company from other industries that has the closest size to that of 
the target MFC. We exclude firms in the financial industry from the “other industries” group in our matching procedure. In 
Panel B, we select the matched votes that have the same characteristic in each Model (ISS against management votes in 
Model 1, close-call votes (percentage of “for” votes between 25% and 75%) in Model 2, low non-mutual fund support votes 
(percentage of non-mutual fund “for” vote less than 50%) in Model 3, and director election votes in Model 4) from the same 
voting company, in the same voting season, on the same proposal type, and on the target company from other industries that 
has the closest size to that of the target MFC. The dependent variable is one if the majority of funds within a family vote 
with the target management recommendation. Own industry (0,1) equals one if the company being voted on (the target 
company) is in the mutual fund industry. Closeness (0,1) equals one if the distance between the headquarters of the voting 
MFC and the headquarters of the target MFC is less than 100 miles. Holding stake is fitted value from the first stage 
regression in Model 1 of Appendix B. Public voting firm (0,1) equals one if the voting firm is publicly traded. Other 
variables are self-explanatory or defined elsewhere. All regressions control for (investing MFC × proposal type), industry 
and year fixed effects. We double cluster standard errors by (investing MFC × proposal type) and report p-values in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 6 The probability of voting with target management’s recommendation within the mutual fund 
industry 
 Votes by all voting firms  Votes by public voting firms 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept -9.7227*** -7.1351*** -11.2063***  -0.6274 1.3138** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.8982) (0.0179) 
Public voting firm (0,1) 35.5129** 51.1671***    
(0.0272) (0.0049)    
Competitive threat 41.6487*** 43.2260***  43.2953*** 44.4459** 
(0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.0155) 
Closeness (0,1) -0.4160  9.5459*** 8.4981*** 
(0.1363)  (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Holding stake  0.4168** 0.5338*** 0.5279***  2.0373*** 1.9190*** 
(0.0126) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Common information 1.1164*** 0.8173** 0.8071**  0.1427 1.0660** 
(0.0050) (0.0254) (0.0275)  (0.8208) (0.0458) 
ln(Voting firm’s number of funds) 0.1568 0.2530 0.2498  0.2674 0.3018 
(0.4666) (0.2183) (0.2180)  (0.4347) (0.4597) 
Target firm’s prior year return 0.5957 0.5110 0.4257  5.6066*** 5.2094*** 
(0.3326) (0.4142) (0.5038)  (0.0013) (0.0018) 
ln(Target firm’s market value of assets) 0.1838** 0.1664** 0.1612**  0.2706 -0.0093 
(0.0250) (0.0488) (0.0478)  (0.1759) (0.9241) 
ISS recommendation = management (0,1) 8.2446*** 7.6233*** 7.6482***  6.7951*** 6.8318*** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Friendly target    3.4937*** 
  (0.0001) 
Reciprocal stake     4.1867*** 
    (0.0001) 
Common interest (0,1) -0.2754
 (0.7426) 
Social ties (0,1)  1.7069*** 
 (0.0001) 
N 14554 14554 14554  1677 1677 
Pseudo R2 0.7966 0.8052 0.8056  0.9169 0.9265 
Regression’s  p-value 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001  0.0001 0.0001 
Notes. In this table, we report logistic regressions modeling the probability of investing MFCs voting with target MFC 
management recommendations during 2004-2013. The dependent variable equals one if the majority of funds within a 
family vote with the target MFC management recommendation and zero otherwise. Competitive threat captures the extent to 
which the target MFC overlaps with the voting MFC across mutual fund objectives, using the Lipper classification. To 
calculate this variable, we multiply the proportion of the investing MFC’s assets under management in a given objective by 
the target MFC’s market share in that objective, and sum across objectives that the investing MFC has funds in. Common 
information is the proportion of time that target and voting companies agree when voting on a third party in the past three 
years. Friendly target is the proportion of time that the target company votes with management recommendation of the 
voting company in the last voting season. Reciprocal stake is the percentage of sole voting authority shares (out of the total 
number of shares outstanding) of the investing MFC held by the target MFC. Common interest (0,1) equals one if the voting 
company proposes the same proposal in the last voting season. Social ties (0,1) equals one if there is any connection 
identified in BoardEx among board members and senior executives between targets and voting companies. Other variables 
are self-explanatory or defined elsewhere. All regressions control for (investing MFC × proposal type) and year fixed effects. 
We double cluster standard errors by (investing MFC × proposal type) and report p-values in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 7 The effects of own-industry support 
Panel A: Director re-nomination probability  
Dependent variable = Director re-nominated (0,1) Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept 0.1618*** 0.2322 
 (0.0010) (0.6529) 
Total ownership by all voting MFCs in the target MFC 0.1745***  
 (0.0001)  
Total ownership by all voting MFCs in the target MFC (fitted)  1.0676*** 
 (0.0001)
ln (Target firm’s market value of assets) -0.0017 -0.0014 
 (0.1180) (0.3496) 
Target firm’s prior year industry adjusted return -0.0346*** -0.0132** 
 (0.0033) (0.0350) 
Proportion of “For” votes 0.0284** 0.1077***
 (0.0395) (0.0019) 
ln(Director’s age) -0.0348*** -0.0333*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
ln(Director’s outside board seats) 0.0229*** 0.0241*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Female director (0,1) -0.0090 -0.0130*** 
 (0.2418) (0.0001) 
Independent director (0,1) 0.0054*** 0.0062*** 
 (0.0076) (0.0075) 
Director ownership (as proportion of shares outstanding) 0.1362*** 0.1262***
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Classified board (0,1) -0.0166** -0.0168** 
 (0.0115) (0.0118) 
Pseudo R2 0.5124 0.5612 
Regression’s  p-value 0.0001 0.0001 
Panel B: Abnormal returns around voting day 
Dependent variable = Voting day CAR(-1,+1) Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept -0.0499 -0.1016** 
 (0.2771) (0.0313) 
Total ownership by all voting MFCs in the target MFC  -0.0557**  
 (0.0249)  
Total ownership by all voting MFCs in the target MFC (fitted)  -0.2401* 
  (0.0835) 
ln (Target firm’s market value of assets) 0.0004 0.0006 
 (0.5521) (0.3523) 
Target firm’s prior year industry adjusted return -0.0013 -0.0014 
 (0.8924) (0.8756) 
Proportion of “For” votes 0.0366* 0.0708*** 
 (0.0555) (0.0035) 
ln(Director’s age) 0.0065 0.0084 
 (0.4668) (0.3426)
ln(Director’s outside board seats) 0.0005* 0.0006* 
 (0.0805) (0.0976) 
Female director (0,1) 0.0027 0.0041 
 (0.3465) (0.1473) 
Independent director (0,1) 0.0002* 0.0018**
 (0.0928) (0.0458) 
Director ownership (as proportion of shares outstanding) 0.0019 0.0029 
 (0.5147) (0.3263) 
Adjusted R2 0.3542 0.3467 
Regression’s  p-value 0.0001 0.0001 
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Panel C: CEO turnover probability 
Dependent variable = CEO turnover (0,1) Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept -0.1474*** -0.4583*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Total ownership by all voting MFCs in the target MFC -0.0088***  
 (0.0096)  
Total ownership by all voting MFCs in the target MFC (fitted)  -0.0138*** 
  (0.0008) 
ln (Target firm’s market value of assets) 0.0003* 0.0000 
 (0.0884) (0.5492) 
Target firm’s prior year industry adjusted return -0.0043* -0.0038* 
 (0.0533) (0.0608) 
Average proportion of “For” votes across all proposals -0.0036 -0.0010 
 (0.4652) (0.9259) 
CEO’s age  65 (0,1) 0.0087 0.0263*** 
 (0.7355) (0.0001) 
CEO tenure -0.0012*** -0.0010*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
CEO chairman (0,1) -0.0067 -0.0305** 
 (0.6076) (0.0001) 
CEO ownership (as proportion of shares outstanding) -0.0008* -0.0009*
 (0.0797) (0.0785) 
CEO’s excess compensation -0.0063*** -0.0149*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Pseudo R2 0.4224 0.4815 
Regression’s  p-value 0.0001 0.0001
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Panel D: CEO’s excess compensation 
Dependent variable = Change in CEO’s excess compensation Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept -3.7703*** -2.5215*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Total ownership by all voting MFCs in the target MFC 0.9028**  
 (0.0411)  
Total ownership by all voting MFCs in the target MFC (fitted)  1.4467** 
  (0.0129) 
ln (Target firm’s market value of assets) 0.0125 0.0082 
 (0.5193) (0.6812) 
Target firm’s prior year industry adjusted return 0.1025 0.1748* 
 (0.2714) (0.0674) 
Average proportion of “For” votes across all proposals 0.4510 0.6752 
 (0.1927) (0.2072) 
CEO’s age  65 (0,1) 0.1851*** 0.3896*** 
 (0.0099) (0.0001) 
CEO tenure -0.1056*** -0.1117*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
CEO chairman (0,1) 0.1482** 0.0771* 
 (0.0128) (0.0950) 
CEO ownership (as proportion of shares outstanding) 0.4353*** 0.4273***
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
CEO salary and bonus 0.5037*** 0.4661*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
CEO turnover (0,1) 0.2278* 0.0897 
 (0.0682) (0.5295)
Compensation proposal (0,1) 0.0495 0.0064 
 (0.6303) (0.9511) 
Adjusted R2 0.3352 0.3832 
Regression’s  p-value 0.0001 0.0001 
Notes. In Panel A, we examine the likelihood of a director being re-nominated for election when her term ends based on the 
total ownership by all voting MFCs in the target MFC (as a proportion of the target MFC’s shares outstanding) using 465 
director election proposals voted at our sample target MFCs. In Panel B, we take 465 director election proposals voted at our 
sample target MFCs and regress the target firm’s cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding the voting day on the 
total ownership by all voting MFCs in the target MFC. Target firm’s CARs are estimated over the window of three days 
around the voting date, calculated as the residual from the market Model estimated during the one year window ending one 
year prior to the voting date. In Panel C, we model the effect of the total ownership by all voting MFCs in the target MFC 
and the average support for proposals in the current voting season on the likelihood of CEO turnover in the next voting 
season using a panel of 166 firm-year observations with data available from Execucomp. The proportion of votes in favor of 
management is averaged across proposals in the same year for each firm. The dependent variable equals one if the CEO 
departs between the current and the next shareholder meetings. Excess CEO compensation is estimated as the residual from 
the first stage regression of the logarithm of CEO’s salary and bonus on the log of market cap, the prior three-year returns, 
and two-digit SIC industry and year fixed effects as in Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004). In Panel D, we model the effect 
of the total ownership by all voting MFCs in the target MFC and the average support for proposals in the current voting 
season on the change in CEO’s excess compensation in the next voting season using a panel of 166 firm-year observations 
with data available from Execucomp. Total ownership by all voting MFCs in the target MFC (fitted) is the sum of the fitted 
changes in ownership stakes by voting MFCs in the target MFC, which are obtained from the first stage regression in Model 
2 of Appendix B. All regressions control for year fixed effects. We cluster standard errors by target MFCs and report p-
values in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  
41 
Table 8 Voting evidence on other types of financial institutions  
 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept -2.0571*** -1.8527***
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Proportion of target’s shares owned by financial firms -0.5741*** -0.7799*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Financial firm target (0,1) -0.1576*** -0.4108*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0001) 
Proportion of target’s shares owned by financial firms × Financial firm target (0,1) 0.3904*** 0.7154*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) 
Target firm’s confidential voting (0,1) -0.1204*** -0.1344*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
ISS recommends “for” (0,1) 2.0234*** 2.0482***
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
ln (Target firm’s market value of assets) -0.0386*** -0.0438*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0006) 
Target firm’s prior year industry adjusted return 0.0032 -0.0217*** 
 (0.1664) (0.0001)
Average distance from target to investors  -0.0267* 
  (0.0545) 
Average connections between target and investors  1.2280*** 
  (0.0001) 
   
Proposal type and year fixed effects Yes Yes 
N 134,000 98,628 
Pseudo R2 0.5351 0.5503 
Regression’s  p-value 0.0001 0.0001 
Notes. This table presents evidence on voting outcomes for financial and non-financial target firms. We take all the 
proposals in our sample and regress the log-odds proportion of votes in favor of management for each stock being voted on 
the following key independent variables: (i) Financial sector holding proportions of the stock; (ii) Financial sector dummy 
variable indicating whether the stock concerned is a financial firm; (iii) Interaction between financial firm target and 
proportion of target’s shares owned by financial firms; (iv) Whether the target firm has confidential voting. We additionally 
control for the weighted average distance (in thousands of miles) between the target and its institutional investors, as well as 
the weighted average number of BoardEx connections between the target and its institutional investors. Both averages are 
weighted by the market value of shares held in a given target by its institutional investors. The distance between any two 
companies is based on the distance between the headquarters of the two companies. For non-US companies, distance is 
measured from the US headquarters of the company concerned. We cluster standard errors by proposal type and year and 
report p-values in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Figure 1            Voting relationships in the financial sector and the mutual fund industry 
 
